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Abstract
The notion of a cyclic game has been introduced by Selten and Wood-
ers (2001). They illustrate the concept by the analysis of a cyclic duopoly
game. The experiments reported concern this game. The game was played
by eleven matching groups of six players each. The observed choice fre-
quencies were compared with the predictions of Nash equilibrium, impulse
balance equilibrium (Selten, Abbink and Cox (2005), Selten and Chmura
(2007)) and two-sample equilbrium (Osborne and Rubinstein(1998)). Pair-
wise comparisons by the Wilcoxon Signed-rank test show that impulse
balance equilibrium as well as two-sample equilibrium have a signiﬁcantly
better predictive success than Nash equilibrium. The diﬀerence between
impulse balance equilibrium and two-sample equilibrium is not signiﬁcant.
In each matching group three players acted only in uneven periods and the
other three only in even periods. This game has two pure strategy equi-
libria in which both types of players behave diﬀerently. The data exhibit
a weak but signiﬁcant tendency in the direction of coordination at a pure
strategy equilibrium.
Keywords: cyclic game duopoly experiment, impulse balance equi-
librium, two-sample equilibrium
JEL classiﬁcation: C73, D43, C90
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versity of Bonn, Adenaueralle 24-42, 53113 Bonn, Germany, eMail: sebastian.goerg@uni-
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11 Introduction
In a paper by Selten and Wooders (2001) the notion of a cyclic game is deﬁned
and illustrated by the example of a duopoly game. In this model a supplier
enters a market and stays there for two periods and then exits. This means
that a ﬁrm exists for exactly two periods. One may think of taxi concessions
in a small town, which last for a limited time. The market is too narrow to
permit more than two taxis at the same time.
A cyclical game may be looked upon as a condensed description of an inﬁnite
game. In the following we shall describe the inﬁnite game structure underlying
our experiment. The game runs over periods t = 1,2,... In each period t a
potential entrant t has to decide wether he enters the market or not in period
t. If he enters he stays in the market for periods t and t + 1 and exits then. A
potential entrant t may face an empty market, this is always true for t=1. For
t = 2,3,... the market is empty at period t if the potential entrant t−1 did not
enter the market. The market is occupied for t with t = 2,3,.. if the potential
entrant t − 1 did enter the market.
Potential Entrant t+1
Enter Not Enter
Potential entrant t Enter U + V 2U
Not Enter W W
Table 1: Possible payoﬀs for the situation of an empty market
Potential entrant t+1
Enter Not Enter
Potential entrant t Enter 2V V + U
Not Enter W W
Table 2: Payoﬀs for the situation of an occupied market
Tables 1 and 2 describe the payoﬀs of a potential entrant t with t = 1,2,...
for the two cases of an empty or occupied market at period t. In both cases
not entering the market yields a payoﬀ W for the two periods together by an
alternative use of capital. The payoﬀ for entering depends on the choice of the
next potential entrant t + 1. In the case of an empty market the payoﬀ for
period t is U and the payoﬀ for period t+1 is V if the potential entrant enters
the market and U if he does not. Similarly, if the market is occupied in period
t, the payoﬀ is V for period t. The payoﬀ for period t + 1 is V or U depending
wether the potential entrant t + 1 enters or not.
It is assumed, that the parameters U, V and W satisfy the following in-
equality:
2U + V > W > 2V
This inequality implies U > V . It can be seen by table 1, that in the
situation of an empty market entry is a dominant strategy of the potential
entrant. However, in the situation of an occupied market no strategy of the
potential entrant is dominated.
The game situation described above extends over an inﬁnite number of time
periods. However, in an experiment one cannot play for inﬁnite time. Therefore,
our experiments run over 200 periods. The calculation of somebody’s payoﬀ,
who enters in the last period requires the decision of a potential entrant in
the next period. This creates an ”end-problem”. We solved this problem by
substituting a randomly chosen decision of an earlier entrant facing an occupied
market for the decision in the next round.
In the underlying game model one thinks of every potential entrant as a
diﬀerent player. Of course it is not practicable to recruit 200 participants for
one observation. This is also not necessary. In our experiments an independent
subject group consisted of 6 players involved in three markets. In the beginning
the odd numbered players 1,3 and 5 were randomly assigned to the three mar-
kets A,B and C as potential entrants. In period two the even numbered players
2,4 and 6 were also randomly assigned as potential entrants to the three mar-
kets. In the next period the same procedure was applied to the odd numbered
players again, etc.. . The players did not know which market they would enter,
they were only told that the assignment to the markets was randomly made.
The concept of a cyclical game permits a condensed description of game
situations like the one investigated in our experiment. In our case, the cyclical
game has only two players. These two players are roles of the potential entrants.
The odd numbered members of an independent subject group are in the role of
player 1 and the even numbered are in the role of player 2.
The transition from the game played in our experiment to the cyclical game
involves a reduction of the strategy space. Every participant is a potential
entrant hundred times. Therefore, behavior may depend on prior experience.
However, the stationary equilibria of the experimental game coincide with the
equilibria of the cyclical game.
We shall not only look at stationary equilibria, but also at 2 stationary be-
havioral concepts. One of these concepts is impulse balance equilibrium (Selten,
Abbink, Cox (2005) and Selten and Chmura (2007)). The other concept was
proposed by Osborne and Rubinstein (1998). These two behavioral concepts
turned out to be especially successful in the experimental comparison by Selten
3and Chmura (2007).
Impulse balance equilibrium is based on learning direction theory (Selten
and Buchta (1999)). This theory concerns situations in which a player selects
a value of one decision parameter out of an interval. According to learning
direction theory, this parameter is increased after a period in which a higher
parameter value would have yielded a greater payoﬀ. Similarly, the parameter
is decreased if a lower value would have yielded a higher payoﬀ.
In our case this theory is not applied to a decision parameter but to the
probability of entry which may be described as a behavioral tendency. A posi-
tive diﬀerence between the payoﬀs for entry and the one for non-entry is called
an impulse in favor of entry. Similarly, a positive diﬀerence between the payoﬀs
for non-entry and for entry is called an impulse for non-entry.
In 2×2 games each strategy has a minimal payoﬀ and the maximum of the
two minimal payoﬀs is called the pure strategy maximin. This pure strategy
maximin is a natural aspiration level. If a lower payoﬀ is obtained, then the
diﬀerence to the pure strategy maximin is perceived as a loss. In 2 × 2 games
a loss is always connected with an impulse towards the other strategy.
Impulse balance equilibrium is reached at a point in which the expected
impulses in both directions are equal. In the paper by Selten and Chmura
(2007) losses were counted double in the computation of impulse balance. This
was reasonable in the context of ordinary 2×2 games. However in this paper the
double counting of losses will not be applied since there is a important diﬀerence
between the 2 × 2 games of Selten and Chmura (2007) and the cyclical game
explored here. Whereas in these 2×2 games a player always receives immediate
feedback about the other player’s choice, in the cyclical game there is no such
feedback in the case of staying out of the market. In this case a player never
learns what he would have earned if he had entered. Entering is the only way
of obtaining feedback about other players’ behavior.
In 2 × 2 games with full feedback about the other players’ choice there
are two reasons for playing a strategy and both are connected to experiences
with playing the other strategy. When the other strategy has been played one
may on the one hand have received an impulse away from it and on the other
hand one may have experienced a loss. Of course the second reason is present
only when there was a loss. Therefore losses are counted double. In cyclical
games there are still two reasons not to enter if entering has resulted in a loss.
However there is also a reason to enter since only by entering information can
be obtained. One may say that one of the reasons for not entering is canceled
by this reason for entering. Therefore counting losses double is not adequate
4for a cyclical game. This argument is summarized by Table 3
reasons in favor of
entering not entering
next player
does not enter
1. gain
2. information
(no impulse)
-
next player
does enter
1. information
.
1. forgone payoﬀ
2. loss
Table 3: Reasons for entering and not entering
The probability to enter is looked upon as a behavioral tendency which is
shaped by prior impulses. The player needs this feedback and is actively seeking
for it. Somebody who does not enter does not get any feedback and therefore
receives no impulse. If after entering the next player does not enter then no
impulse is received because nothing better could have been done. A player
experiences an impulse only if the next player does enter. In this case there are
two reasons for not entering but also one for entering.
We shall use the name two-sample equilibrium for the concept proposed
by Osborne and Rubinstein (1998). Two-sample equilibrium depends on a
parameter, the sample size n. Imagine a stationary equilibrium in which a
player takes two samples of n prior periods, one of periods in which the ﬁrst
strategy was played by this player and another one in which he or she played
the second strategy. Suppose one of the samples yields a higher total payoﬀ,
then the player plays this strategy. If both total payoﬀs are equal, each of the
two strategies is chosen with probability 1
2.
The rule for equal sample payoﬀs is not part of the original concept of
Osborne and Rubinstein. They did not specify behavior in the case of equal
payoﬀs. We added the rule in order to obtain a unique equilibrium prediction.
In a study about twelve 2 × 2 games (Selten and Chmura (2007)) the best
ﬁtting value of the parameter n for the two-sample equilibrium was n = 6. In
the case of the duopoly game, investigated here, n = 5 yields a better ﬁt to the
data.
It turns out, that the two-sample equilibrium, with n = 5 yields the best ﬁt
to the data compared with the other concepts. The impulse balance equilibrium
is almost as successful and no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between these two stationary
concepts can be found. Both concepts are signiﬁcantly more successful than the
Nash equilibrium.
In principle, our experimental setup also permits asymmetric equilibria in
which one of the two players, say player one, always enters and the other player
never enters. This is the case since players who enter in odd periods are always
confronted with potential entrants in an even period. Therefore the two groups,
5those who decide in odd periods and those who decide in even periods, may
have diﬀerent learning histories over time. In fact the data reveal a signiﬁcant
tendency towards convergence to pure strategies. This ﬁnding throws some
doubt on the comparison of the three stationary concepts.
2 The cyclic game
In our experiment the parameters have the following values:
U = 10 V = 2 W = 5
The method of graphical presentation of cyclical games has been explained in
Selten and Wooders (2001). There the duopoly game experimented here has
been used as an example with abstract parameters U, V and W. Figure 1 shows
the same drawing but with the experimented parameter values shown instead
of U, V and W.
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Figure 1: Structure of the cyclic duopoly game
The ﬁgure has the structure of a directed graph with 3 types of nodes and
additional information regarding player and payoﬀ. Each point describes a
situation of either player 1 or player 2. At a decision point a player has to
decide between two alternatives in our case IN or OUT. Here IN means entering
and OUT means not entering. At a payoﬀ point or an exit and payoﬀ point the
payoﬀ of the concerning player is shown in rectangular brackets above this point.
The arrows show the direction in which the game moves from one situation to
the next.
6At the upper right corner player 1 can decide between IN and OUT in a
situation of an empty market. In the case OUT he receives a payoﬀ of 5 at a
payoﬀ and exit point. If he chooses IN he receives a payoﬀ of 10 in this period
and the game moves to a decision point of player 2. If than player 2 chooses
OUT ﬁrst a payoﬀ and exit point is reached at which player 2 receives 5 and
then a payoﬀ and exit point of player 1 where he receives 10. From there the
game moves back to the upper right corner. The other part of the ﬁgure are
understood in the same way.
3 Three stationary concepts for the cyclic game
We shall look at three stationary concepts Nash equilibrium, impulse balance
equilibrium and two-sample equilibrium. As has been shown in Selten and
Wooders (2001) the cyclic game has three Nash equilibria. A symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium and two pure strategy equilibria. In the symmetric
mixed equilibrium the probability α for entering if the market is occupied is as
follows:
α =
U + V − W
U − V
= 0.875
If the market is empty the probability of entering is one. This is also true for
the two pure equilibria. However, there the probabilities α1 and α2 are
α1 = 1 and α2 = 0
in the ﬁrst pure strategy equilibrium and
α1 = 0 and α2 = 1
in the second pure strategy equilibrium.
We now turn our attention to the impulse balance equilibrium. Learning
direction theory looks at probabilities of decisions as behavioral tendencies. The
probabilities are adjusted in the light of experiences after a decision has been
made. After a decision a player thinks about wether the decision was the right
one. If he comes to the conclusion that the decision could have been improved
he receives an impulse towards the better choice or more precisely the choice
which would have been the better one, ex-post. Applied to the cyclical game
this picture of the mental process meets the diﬃculty that after not entering no
feedback is received. The question arises how in this case the player can ﬁnd a
substitute for the missing feedback. We shall discuss this problem below.
Let α be the probability of entering at impulse balance equilibrium. If he
7enters and the next player also enters he receives an impulse of W −2V towards
not entering. He receives no impulse if the next player does not enter since in
this case entering ex-post proofed to be the best choice. If the other player also
enters he gets an impulse of W − 2V . Therefore the probability of getting an
impulse for not entering is α2.
We now consider the case that the player does not enter. In this case he does
not receive any feedback. Impulse balance equilibrium is based on the picture
of a mental process which substitutes this lack of feedback by imagination.
This mental process does not involve any ex-ante deliberation but only ex-post
reﬂections. This also applies to the cognitive process of imagining the behavior
of the hypothetical next player. This hypothetical player ﬁnds himself in the
same situation of an occupied market as he himself did. Therefore he applies the
same mental process he used to make his own decision. In this way he forms a
deﬁnite assumption about how the hypothetical next player would have acted.
At equilibrium this mental process leads to entering with probability α and
not entering with probability 1 − α. Therefore with probability α the player
arrives at the assumption that the hypothetical next player did enter and with
probability 1 − α he imagines that the hypothetical player did not enter. If he
assumes that the hypothetical next player did enter then he chose the ex-post
optimal alternative and therefore receives no imagined impulse. If he imagines
that the hypothetical next player did enter he receives an imagined impulse of
U + V − W in the direction of entering.
The player ﬁrst chooses not to enter with probability 1 − α and then with
the same probability 1−α he assumes that the next hypothetical player would
not have entered. The probability of these two successive events is (1 − α)2.
This leads to an imagined impulse of U+V −W with the probability of (1−α)2.
Figure 2 describes this situation and gives the actual or imagined impulses
depending on the decision of the next player or on the assumption about the
behavior of the hypothetical next player.
•
IN
 
                      
OUT
1  
                                           
next player
IN
 
                 
OUT
1  
                                hypothetical player
IN
 
                
OUT
1  
                                 
W   2V no impulse no impulse U + V   W
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Figure 2: Impulses in the direction of the other strategy
8At equilibrium the mathematical expectation of impulses in the direction
of not entering is equal to the one towards entering. This is expressed by the
following impulse balance equation:
α2(W − 2V ) = (1 − α)2(V + U − W)
Thus, the probability of entering an occupied market can be stated as:
α =
√
V + U − W
√
W − 2V +
√
V + U − W
= 0.726
Pure strategy Nash equilibria are also impulse balance equilibria. In a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium nobody receives any impulse.
The last stationary concept we will report on is the two-sample equilib-
rium. Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) introduced the idea behind this concept
which is as follows: The player draws two samples of equal sizes n, one for the
strategy IN and one for the strategy OUT. He then forms the payoﬀ sums in
the two samples and compares them and plays the strategy with the highest
payoﬀ sum. If both payoﬀ sums are equal he ﬂips a coin and thus choses a pure
strategy with probability 1
2. The sample size n is a parameter.
We now describe how the probability α for entering is determined in the case
of two-sample equilibrium. Consider a sample of n cases in which the player
has played IN. Let k be the number of cases in this sample in which the next
player entered. Let Sk be the payoﬀ sum of the sample we have
Sk = 12(n − k) + 4k.
This payoﬀ sum Sk must be compared to the payoﬀ sum 5n obtained for not
entering n-times. The player does not enter if the payoﬀ sum diﬀerence
Dk = 5n − Sk = 8k − 7n
is positive. In the case Dk = 0 the probability of not entering is 1
2. The con-
ditional probability of not entering if there are k cases of next players entering
in the sample for IN is as follows
η(n,k) =

   
   
0 for 7n > 8k
1
2 for 7n = 8k
1 for 7n < 8k
With the help of this notation we now can derive an equation for the entry
9probability α:
α = 1 −
n X
k=0
η(n,k)

n
k

αk
The sum on the right hand side of this equation is the total probability
of not entering. The probability of not entering if there are exactly k cases
with next players entering in the sample for IN is η(n,k) times the binomial
probability for k out of n players entering.
We shall now show that the equation for α has exactly one solution with
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. In order to see this one can look at the left and the right hand side
of the equation as functions of α and imagine that they are shown in a diagram.
The left hand side is the 45 degree line. The right hand side begins with the
value of 1 for α = 1 and than decreases in view of η(n,n) = 1. Therefore the
two curves have exactly one intersection at a value of 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
It can be seen that without diﬃculty that for n = 1,..,10 the equation for
α takes the following forms:
α = 1 − αn , for n = 1,..,7
α = 1 − 4α7 − α8 , for n = 8
α = 1 − nαn−1 − αn , for n = 9,10
For the purposes of this paper it is not necessary to compute the two-sample
probability α for larger samples.
It is not immediately clear whether a strict pure strategy equilibrium can
be considered a two-sample equilibrium. If really always only the equilibrium
strategy has been played in the past there is no sample for the other strategy.
4 Experimental design
The experiment was carried out in 2005 at the Laboratory for Experimental
Economics, University of Bonn. The participants, all students, were invited via
the ORSEE1 database of the laboratory.
Four sessions were conducted, in three sessions there were 18 participants
and in one session only twelve. The participants did not know that they were
subdivided into independent subject groups of six. Therefore they were let
to belief that there are nine or six markets to which they could be randomly
assigned. In our experiment we had 11 independent matching groups of 6
players each. This means there were altogether 66 participants.
1Greiner (2004)
10At the beginning of the experiment the participants were briefed with a writ-
ten instruction2, which was read out to them. Afterwards the participants were
separated into cabins with computer terminals and the experiment started3.
The payoﬀs in the game were given in the ﬁctitious currency Taler and at
the end of the game transferred in to Euro with an exchange rate of 1 Taler
equals 1 EuroCent. In addition to the cumulated payoﬀs subjects received a
show-up fee of 5 Euro. To guarantee anonymity of the decisions participants
were separately payed. Overall one session lasted about one hour and the payoﬀs
were between 10 and 16 Euros.
5 The experimental results
The three concepts serve as predictions for the frequencies for entering a free
market and an occupied market. As in the already mentioned study by Selten
and Chmura (2007), we do not assume that the theories can predict the behavior
of a single player. We compare the predictive power of the three concepts for the
average behavior in independent subject groups. In each independent subject
group i we will use the quadratic distance
Qi = (α − fi)2
between the theoretical probabilities α and the observed mean relative fre-
quency fi as the measure of predictive success. The overall predictive success is
measured by the mean of all theses quadratic distances over the elven subject
groups.
Q =
1
11
11 X
i=1
Qi
In the following we will ﬁrst search for the sample size n of the two-sample
equilibrium with the best ﬁt to the data. Then we will compare the predictive
success of the three theories. We will compare the overall predictive success
and wether this success measure changes over time. Afterwards we will analyze
tendencies of convergences towards the pure strategy equilibria.
5.1 Comparison of Sample Sizes for Two-Sample Equilibrium
In the study by Selten and Chmura (2007) the sample size 6 yielded to the best
ﬁt for the data in the named 2×2-games. However, it is not clear whether this
2See Appendix C for the translated instruction
3See Appendix B for screenshots of the experiment
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Figure 3: Mean quadratic distance for diﬀerent sample sizes
sample size would lead to the predictions with the best ﬁt to the data in our
cyclical game. Therefore, we compared the predictive success of diﬀerent sample
sizes. Figure 3 shows the quadratic distances for the two-sample equilibrium
with the sample sizes n=2,...,10. It can be seen that the sample size 5 yields
the best ﬁt to the data, while a sample size of 6 would have lead to weaker
results. We will base our comparison of the stationary concepts on the two-
sample equilibria with both sample sizes.
5.2 Predicted and Observed relative Frequencies
We will start with the comparison of the relative frequencies obtained in our
experiment with the predictions of the three concepts in the case of an empty
market. In this case all three concepts predict a frequency of 1 for entry.
In three of the eleven observations this prediction is correct and all potential
entrants join the markets when they are empty. In the other eight observations
the relative entry frequencies are very high, too. The smallest entry rate is
0.9506. It is not surprising that the participants realize that the strategy of not
entering the market is dominated in this case by the strategy of entering the
market. The numerical values for all observations are shown in table 8 in the
appendix.
In the case of an occupied market the three stationary concepts predict
diﬀerent relative frequencies of entry. Table 4 shows the observed relative fre-
quency and the quadratic distance to each of the three concepts for all eleven
observations. We will use the quadratic distance as our measurement for the
12predictive power of the three concepts.
The mean quadratic distance of the two-sample equilibrium with n = 5
to the observations is marginally smaller than the mean quadratic distance
of the impulse balance equilibrium, while the mean quadratic distance of the
two-sample equilibrium with n = 6 is bigger than the mean quadratic distance
of the impulse balance equilibrium. The mean quadratic distance of the Nash
equilibrium to the data is the biggest in comparison with the other two concepts.
Figure 4 gives the quadratic distances of each of the three stationary con-
cepts to the data in the eleven observations.
Observed
Relative
Nash
Equilibrium
Impulse
Balance
Two - Sample
Equilibrium
Frequencies Equilibrium n = 5 n = 6
0.8068 0.0046 0.0066 0.0027 0.0008
0.7841 0.0083 0.0034 0.0008 0.0000
0.7292 0.0213 0.0000 0.0007 0.0024
0.7325 0.0203 0.0000 0.0005 0.0021
0.7479 0.0162 0.0005 0.0001 0.0009
0.7271 0.0219 0.0000 0.0008 0.0026
0.7447 0.0170 0.0004 0.0001 0.0011
0.7065 0.0284 0.0050 0.0024 0.0051
0.7964 0.0062 0.0000 0.0017 0.0003
0.7238 0.0229 0.0053 0.0010 0.0029
0.6530 0.0493 0.0156 0.0104 0.0156
0.0197 0.0020 0.0019 0.0031
Table 4: Quadratic distances in full markets
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Figure 4: Quadratic distances in full markets
In six observations the quadratic distance to impulse balance equilibrium is
the smallest, in two observation the quadratic distance to two-sample equilib-
13rium with sample size 5 is the smallest and in three observations the quadratic
distance to the two-sample equilibrium with sample size 6 is the smallest. The
quadratic distance to the Nash equilibrium is in one observation smaller than
the quadratic distance to the impulse balance equilibrium, but nevertheless
larger than the quadratic distances to the 2 two-sample equilibria. In the other
ten observations the quadratic distance to the Nash equilibrium is the largest
of all three theories.
Testing the quadratic distances to the data of the three concepts with the
two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test, we obtain the results given in table 5.
The signiﬁcances are in favor of the row concept. No statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the predictive power of the 2 two-sample equilibria and the
impulse balance equilibrium can be observed. But both concepts ﬁt the data
highly signiﬁcantly better than the Nash equilibrium does. The two-sample
equilibrium with the smaller sample size performs signiﬁcantly better than the
two-sample equilibrium with the higher sample size does.
Nash
Equilibrium
Two-Sample
Equilibrium
n=6
Impulse
Balance
Equilibrium
Two-Sample
Equilibrium
n=5
0.0033 0.0754 n.s.
Impulse
Balance
Equilibrium
0.0058 n.s. -
Two-Sample
Equilibrium
n=6
0.0033 - -
Table 5: Two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the quadratic distances to the
data in favor of the row concept
5.3 Changes over Time
Up to here we have analyzed the data on an aggregated basis and could elicit
an order for the predictive success for 200 periods. We now investigate whether
this order changes over time. In our experiment players had to decide whether
they enter or do not enter the market 100 times. Thus, our analyses are limited
to this 100 decisions. We compare the ﬁrst 50 decisions with the second 50
decisions. Figure 5 gives the mean quadratic distance of the three theories to
the observed frequency of entering the market for the ﬁrst 50 decisions, for the
second 50 decisions and for all 100 decisions.
The mean quadratic distance of the Nash equilibrium to the data decreases
over time, while the mean quadratic distances of the impulse balance equilib-
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Figure 5: Quadratic distances to the data for the ﬁrst 50 decisions, the second
50 decisions and overall
rium and of the two-sample equilibrium with a sample sizes of n = 5 are slightly
increasing. Neither the improvement of the performance of the Nash equilib-
rium nor the disimprovement of impulse balance equilibrium and the two-sample
equilibrium are statistically signiﬁcant (Wilcoxon Signed Rank test).
Table 6 shows the two tailed signiﬁcances of the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test
in favor of the row concept. The ﬁrst value in a cell is the level of signiﬁcance in
the ﬁrst 50 decisions and the second value is the level of signiﬁcance in the second
50 decisions. Comparing the behavioral concepts with the Nash equilibrium, the
signiﬁcance levels are a little bit weaker in the second 50 decisions than in the
ﬁrst. Nevertheless, the tendencies are the same as in the overall comparison:
The prediction of the Nash equilibrium has a signiﬁcantly weaker predictive
success than the predictions of impulse balance equilibrium and of the two-
sample equilibria with sample sizes of n = 5 and n = 6. No signiﬁcant diﬀerence
can be found for the comparison of the predictive success of impulse balance
equilibrium and both two-sample equilibria. The comparison between the 2
two-sample equilibria is signiﬁcant only for the ﬁrst 50 rounds.
5.4 Convergence to Pure Strategies?
In the above analysis we compared the mean entrance frequencies with the
prediction of the three concepts in mixed strategies. However there are also
further asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies. In these equilibria one player
always enters an occupied market whereas the other never does this. Of course
at equilibrium the ﬁrst type of player never gets an opportunity to enter an
15Nash
Equilibrium
Two-Sample
Equilibrium
n=6
Impulse
Balance
Equilibrium
Two-Sample
Equilibrium
n=5
0.0033
0.0099
0.0616
n.s.
n.s.
n.s.
Impulse
Balance
Equilibrium
0.0044
0.0164
n.s.
n.s. -
Two-Sample
Equilibrium
n=6
0.0033
0.0099 - -
Table 6: Two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the quadratic distances of
the data in round 1-50 (top) and rounds 51-100 (bottom) in favor of the row
concept
occupied market but nevertheless it is his strategy to do this if he can. In our
experimental setup coordination at an asymmetric pure equilibrium is possible
since one type of players decides to enter a market or not in odd periods and the
other one in even periods. It is quite possible that learning processes produce
a tendency towards a coordination at an asymmetric pure equilibrium. In the
following we shall argue that a weak tendency in this direction can be observed
in our data.
Of course it can not be predicted how the roles in the asymmetric equi-
librium will be distributed to the players deciding in odd and even rounds.
However we can compare the relative frequencies of entries into occupied mar-
kets for players deciding in odd and even periods in the ﬁrst 50 and the second
50 decisions. Therefore we form the quadratic distance between the entrance
rates in even and odd periods. Table 7 gives these quadratic distances for the
ﬁrst and second 50 rounds per observation.
Observation Quadratic Distance in
1-50 51-100
1 0.0007 0.0059
2 0.0002 0.1444
3 0.0097 0.0940
4 0.0025 0.1182
5 0.0125 0.0072
6 0.0465 0.1764
7 0.0312 0.0933
8 0.1044 0.0614
9 0.0021 0.0982
10 0.0044 0.0281
11 0.0405 0.0045
Mean 0.0232 0.0756
Table 7: Quadratic distance between entry in odd and even periods
In 8 of the 11 observations the quadratic distance of entry in odd and even
16rounds increases over time and the mean distance over all observations increases.
A tendency towards coordination to a pure strategy equilibrium would lead
to such an increase. The two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test between the
quadratic distances in the ﬁrst and second 50 decisions reveals a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence with p = 0.0505.
6 Summary and Discussion
In this paper three stationary concepts, namely mixed Nash equilibrium, Im-
pulse balance equilibrium, and two-sample equilibrium, have been compared
in an experimental setting. The game played in the experiment was a market
entry game based on the structure of a cyclical game introduced by Selten and
Wooders (2001).
Eleven independent subject groups participated in the experiment. Each
independent subject group consisted of 6 participants, three deciding in odd
rounds and three deciding in even rounds. Each subject group played over 200
rounds with random matching.
In the case of an empty market all three theories predicted entry and nearly
all participants acted accordingly.
In the case of an occupied market we used the mean squared distance be-
tween predicted and observed frequencies as the measurement of the predictive
success of a theory. The comparison of the mean squared distances reveals the
following order, from best to worst: two-sample equilibrium with a sample size
of n = 5, impulse balance equilibrium, two-sample equilibrium with a sample
size of n = 6 and mixed Nash equilibrium.
To test whether the observed order is statistically reliable we applied a
pairwise comparison with the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The test conﬁrmed
that the mixed Nash equilibrium is the worst ﬁtting concept and that the two-
sample equilibrium with the smaller sample size ﬁts the data better than the
two-sample equilibrium with the higher sample size does. The rank of the im-
pulse balance could not be conﬁrmed. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
the predictive success of impulse balance equilibrium on one side and each of the
two-sample equilibria on the other side. The performance rank two of impulse
balance equilibrium may be due to random ﬂuctuations.
The best sample size for the two-sample equilibrium was ﬁve. However,
since only one probability had to be predicted, adjusting the sample size to
the data gives an unfair advantage to two-sample equilibrium over the two
non-parametric equilibria, impulse balance equilibrium and mixed Nash equi-
17librium. In order to see it is suﬃcient to look at a very simple theory with one
parameter: This theory just says that the relative frequencies of entry are de-
scribed by a symmetric distribution around an unknown mean. The unknown
mean is the parameter to be estimated from the data. Of course this theory
with one parameter provides the best possible ﬁt. Therefore a comparison of
impulse balance equilibrium with the two-sample equilibrium with the sample
size n = 5 estimated from the data is heavily biased in favor of the two-sample
equilibrium. The comparison of two-sample equilibrium with sample size esti-
mated from the data presented here shows a better performance than impulse
balance equilibrium but despite of the bias produced by the free parameter the
diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant.
To give the comparison a broader basis with more observations we also
applied the two-sample equilibrium with sample size n = 6, which yielded
the best ﬁt over 108 independent subject groups in 12 diﬀerent 2 × 2-games
(Selten and Chmura (2007)). Compared to impulse balance equilibrium the
two-sample equilibrium with sample size n = 6 has a worse performance, but
it is not statistically signiﬁcant.
These ﬁndings give support to the results of Selten and Chmura (2007)
where the Impulse balance equilibrium and the two-sample equilibrium outper-
formed the mixed Nash equilibrium and no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the
two-sample equilibrium and the impulse balance equilibrium could be observed.
Regarding the comparison of impulse balance equilibrium and mixed Nash equi-
librium our results are in line with Avrahami, Kareev and G¨ uth (2005) .
The comparison of the behavioral theories with the mixed Nash equilibrium
is highly signiﬁcant and stable over time when the quadratic distances in the
ﬁrst 50 decisions and the quadratic distances in the second 50 decisions are
tested. Pairwise comparison of the behavioral concepts reveals a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the 2 two-sample equilibria in favor of the equilibrium with
the smaller sample size but only for the ﬁrst 50 decisions. Comparisons with
the impulse balance equilibrium reveals no signiﬁcant diﬀerence.
In addition to the mixed equilibrium the game also has two pure equilibria.
The observed frequencies are far from those predicted by the pure equilibria.
Nevertheless it is not excluded that in the long run learning processes would
result in players entering in odd periods playing one pure equilibrium strat-
egy and those entering in even periods the other one. The quadratic distance
between the relative frequencies of entering in odd and even periods is signif-
icantly higher in the second half of the experiment than in the ﬁrst one. One
may interpret this as a weak tendency towards a pure strategy equilibrium.
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Appendix
A. Table
Observation Market Empty Market Entries Relative Frequency
1 103 99 0,9612
2 109 109 1
3 131 130 0,9924
4 129 129 1
5 124 123 0,9919
6 131 131 1
7 126 121 0,9603
8 140 138 0,9857
9 104 103 0,9904
10 133 131 0,9850
11 162 154 0,9506
Mean: 0,9798
Table 8: Frequency of entries into an empty market
19B. Screenshots
Figure 6: Screenshot decision screen
Figure 7: Screenshot payoﬀ screen
20C. Instructions
Thank you very much for participating in todays decision experiment. Please
read the following instruction carefully. If you do not understand something and
have some questions you can ask them at the end of the this introduction. As
soon as the experiment has started no more questions will be answered. If you
still have questions please take a look at this instructions. For the conduction
of this experiment it is necessary that you do not communicate with other
participants. Please do not talk with the other participants.
In this experiment you can earn money. Your payoﬀ depends on your deci-
sions and other participant’s decisions.
The Experiment
The experiment consists out of 200 rounds. Decisions are done alternating, that
means that everyone decides every two rounds. To which half of the participants
you belong is only known to you.
In the rounds in which you make your decisions you are assigned to a market.
Then you will receive the status of the market, as the market is either free or
occupied. Then you can decide whether you want to enter the market or not.
If you enter the market you stay in the market for two rounds. If you do not
enter the market you stay outside the market for two rounds. After these two
rounds and while the 200 rounds of the experiment are not exhausted you can
decide again. After your decision the ﬁrst round is over and the second round
begins in which players from the other half of participants decide. After this
player have decided the second round is over and you will again be allocated to
a market (mostly a new one). This is repeated 100 times, thus there are 200
rounds to play.
Payoﬀs in the Experiment
In every round you receive a payoﬀ.
If you do not enter the market you receive 5 Taler in the ﬁrst round and 0
Taler in the second round.
If you enter the market you receive an amount in the ﬁrst round which
depends on the status of the market. If the market is empty you receive in the
ﬁrst round a payoﬀ of 10 Taler. If the market is occupied you receive a payoﬀ
in the ﬁrst round of 2 Taler. In the second round your payoﬀ depends on the
decision made by the next participant from the other group randomly allocated
21to this market. If this participant enters the market you receive a payoﬀ of 2
Taler, if he does not enter you receive a payoﬀ of 10 Taler.
The payoﬀs from this rounds are summed up and form your round payoﬀs.
This round payoﬀs are summed up over all rounds and form your total payoﬀ
at the end of the experiment. Your payoﬀ of this experiment is payed to you in
Euro, where 1 Taler is 1 EuroCent.
The following tables should illustrate your payoﬀs:
Your payoﬀs in an empty market:
Next player
Enter Not Enter
You
Enter 10 + 2 10 + 10
Not Enter 5 5
Your payoﬀs in an occupied market:
Next player
Enter Not Enter
You Enter 2 + 2 2 + 10
Not Enter 5 5
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